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SERENA FELOJ(Fondazione San Carlo)
R.R. CLEWIS
THE KANTIAN SUBLIME
AND THE REVELATION OF FREEDOM
The sublime is one of the most obscure terms of Kantianphilosophy. Its definition is rather ambiguous and Kant himselfdoesn’t explain what is the role of such an aesthetic feeling.Recently some critical works on Kantian aesthetics have tried toput the sublime in relation to the systematic transition fromnature to freedom. With The Kantian sublime and the revelation of
rreedom, Robert Clewis offers a new reading of the Kantiansublime, that goes beyond all the studies made in the ’70s and inthe ’80s on this topic of aesthetics. In particular, Clewis driftsaway from the interpretation of Lyotard and provides his analysisout of a renewed interest in the role of aesthetic experience inmorality and, conversely, of morality’s role in aesthetics. Clewisfits in with the interpretation of Kantian aesthetics, of which themain exponents are Paul Guyer, Allen Wood, Henry Allison; butClewis’ interpretation is also very original in clarifying someelements connected to the sublime.The aim of Clewis’ work is to highlight how the Kantiansublime can reveal moral freedom and how enthusiasm can beconsidered a form of the sublime in a Critical sense. In order todemonstrate these two elements, the starting point is the idea thatthe sublime indirectly realizes morals into the natural world. Asalso Guyer claims, Clewis supports that the feeling of sublimeprepares us for moral agency and enthusiasm, as particular formsof the sublime help us recognizing the morally good. Clewis tries,then, to look at the role of the sublime in general and at theaesthetically sublime experience of enthusiasm in particular, andhe puts them in relation to the transitional problem concerningthe realization of morality in the natural order. In Clewis’ work,the problem of transition is conceived primarily in the practicaland non-systematic sense; that is to say the transition is not
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considered here as the mediation between the realm of natureand the realm of freedom. The transition consists, instead, in theactualization of morals in the natural world and it concerns howthe supersensible in the subject can determine the sensible withregard to the consequences in nature. Clewis work perfectlyanswers the demand in the Kantian studies for a combination ofaesthetics and morals.In this perspective, Clewis looks at the sublime as a feelingthat can contribute to morality by awakening interest. In order todemonstrate this thesis, Clewis highlights how the sublime isconnected with enthusiasm and this connection explains therelationship between the sublime and morality. First of all, thesublime indicates something purposive in nature in order toreveal something purposive in ourselves, as well as enthusiasmmakes «palpable» human freedom. Enthusiasm is, in fact, «afeeling of freedom to do the morally good». Clewis’ work de-monstrates then a very original thesis by highlighting how enthu-siasm, as an encouraging moral sign, contributes to reinforce therelationship between the sublime and morals, by awakening amoral interest in reason.This thesis is demonstrated also through an accuratehistorical reconstruction of the sublime in the Observations andthe Remarks. An exam of the genesis of Kantian sublime, in fact,confirms Clewis’ idea that we can talk about three different formsof the feeling of sublime: beyond the mathematical and thedynamical sublime, Clewis supports that in the Kantian philo-sophy we can also find the moral sublime. Differently from otherKantian interpreters, and, in particular, differently from Lyotard,Clewis pays a lot of attention to the moral sublime. This particularform of sublime is the aesthetic and disinterested response to themoral law, which reveals the positive practical freedom, that is theability to act from a priori moral motives. The moral sublimecorresponds therefore the effect on consciousness of the obser-vation of the moral law from a disinterested and aestheticalperspective, rather than from a practical point of view. This formof sublime includes moreover the sublime of mental states, amongwhich enthusiasm is included. Enthusiasm, therefore, is a parti-cular form of moral sublime that appears as an affective conte-mplation of the idea of good. By examining aesthetic enthusiasm,certainly the most original aspect of the book, Clewis finally
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succeeds in his aim to demonstrate how the sublime can revealmoral freedom.By referring to Plato, Clewis also compares Platonic enthu-siasm to Kantian interest for the French Revolution: Kant’s inte-rest in enthusiasm for the idea of republic, in fact, is taken byClewis as an example of intellectual interest in the sublime. Under-standing this interest in enthusiasm allows us not only to highlightthe feeling of the sublime, but also to better comprehend Kant’sview of the French Revolution.Although the reference on Kantian interest for the FrenchRevolution opens up a discussion on Kantian political thought thatis not carried out by the author (this topic is directly approachedonly in the short Chapter Six), The Kantian sublime and the
revelation of freedom by Robert Clewis has the great merit ofbringing to scholars’ attention the problem of aesthetic enthu-siasm as a form of the sublime that reveals moral freedom.R.R. Clewis, The Kantian sublime and the revelation of freedom,Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009.
